Can De Wever’s coalition turn its crowded rentrée agenda into decisions?

Prime Minister Bart De Wever’s federal coalition entered its political rentrée on 7 September 2026 with three politically sensitive files awaiting decisions: the sale of up to 20% of Belfius, the situation of students stranded in Gaza despite links to Belgian universities, and the disputed aircraft route over northern Brussels. La Libre identified the dossiers as priorities for the returning government, but no consolidated federal timetable or final package had been published by Monday. The latest official Council of Ministers record, covering an electronic meeting chaired by De Wever on 4 September, contains routine decisions but no settlement of those three disputes.

The Belfius operation is the most advanced. On 20 June, the Council of Ministers approved a draft royal decree giving the Federal Holding and Investment Company, SFPIM, a delegated mandate to find one or more suitable buyers for no more than 20% of the bank. The official communiqué says SFPIM must define participation and selection criteria and conclude the necessary agreements, while Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Pensions Jan Jambon must report periodically on progress. It records an agreement in principle dating from 5 December 2025, but does not identify a buyer or guarantee that a transaction will be completed.

The distinction matters. Belfius remains wholly held on behalf of the Belgian state, and commissioning a sale process is not the same as completing a partial privatisation. In a January 2026 parliamentary committee exchange, Jambon said the government was aiming to conclude the transaction by the end of 2026 and expected proceeds of about €2 billion, intended to limit the increase in public debt. He also argued that Belfius could raise its payout ratio sufficiently to avoid reducing the state’s projected dividend income. Those are government estimates and assumptions, not a disclosed purchase price or binding outcome.

For the Arizona coalition—N-VA, MR, Les Engagés, Vooruit and CD&V—the sale tests whether a one-off receipt can be reconciled with long-term stewardship of a profitable public asset. The federal government acquired the Belgian arm of Dexia during the 2011 banking crisis; Belfius emerged under its present name in 2012. That history explains why the argument is about more than ownership percentages. The government presents a minority investor as a source of outside expertise and balance-sheet relief while retaining public control. PTB Secretary-General Peter Mertens instead calls for a fully public, democratically directed bank and argues that selling a stake sacrifices future influence and dividend income. The price, buyer safeguards and governance rights will determine which interpretation proves closer to reality.

The Gaza file poses a different test: whether legal permission to enter Belgium can be made effective when applicants cannot safely reach a Belgian diplomatic post or leave the territory. During the Chamber’s Foreign Affairs Committee on 15 July, PTB MP Nabil Boukili said roughly 1,400 Palestinians with Belgian visas remained in Gaza and drew attention to students admitted to Belgian universities. Groen MP Meyrem Almaci separately asked the government to permit remote student-visa applications, citing a Brussels court decision involving a Gazan student.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Development Cooperation Maxime Prévot answered that a visa grants a right to stay in Belgium but does not by itself create a Belgian obligation to organise an evacuation. That is the federal government’s legal and operational distinction. Boukili and Almaci frame the matter around the practical value of visas, university places and scholarships that may lapse if their holders cannot travel. The exact number of affected students, their visa status and any evacuation arrangements remain unconfirmed in a current public federal communiqué.

Competences overlap but should not be blurred. Visas, diplomatic action and any Belgian-assisted departure are federal matters. Universities and much education policy belong to the language communities, while safe passage from Gaza depends on authorities and actors outside Belgium. Federal ministers can alter application procedures and pursue diplomatic coordination, but they cannot independently open a border crossing.

The Brussels overflight dispute is similarly divided across institutions. Federal authorities regulate Belgian airspace and aviation operations through the Federal Public Service Mobility and Transport and air-navigation provider skeyes. The Brussels-Capital Region sets and enforces environmental noise standards. Brussels Airport itself lies in Flanders, making every redistribution of flight paths a territorial as well as a technical choice.

Residents and municipal authorities in Schaerbeek, Koekelberg and Molenbeek-Saint-Jean say the RNP 07L arrival route has subjected densely populated neighbourhoods to intensive overflight since summer 2025. Schaerbeek confirmed that it sought to intervene in an environmental cessation case against the Belgian state in July 2026. BX1 reported that the route’s use had been extended until 31 October while federal services studied its impact and alternatives.

Federal Minister for Mobility, Climate and Ecological Transition Jean-Luc Crucke says operational choices were based on safety, weather and a technical proposal from skeyes rather than an intention to favour one territory. Brussels MR president David Weytsman, although his party sits in the federal coalition, argues that an exceptional route must not become permanent through repeated extensions and has demanded a federal answer by 1 October. The competing frames are therefore unusually clear: federal aviation officials emphasise operational safety and the airport’s economic function, while Brussels municipalities emphasise exposure, regional noise law and compliance with court orders.

Together, the three files reveal the governing challenge in the second parliamentary year following the June 2024 federal election. The coalition can initiate procedures from Rue de la Loi, but implementation runs through a state holding company, courts, regional governments, community institutions and foreign authorities. The immediate questions are concrete: whether SFPIM produces an acceptable Belfius buyer, whether ministers establish a workable route for Gaza-linked students, and whether Crucke presents a legally durable overflight solution before the October deadlines. Until those steps occur, the rentrée programme remains a list of decisions to be made rather than a record of decisions delivered.